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Abstract—During high wind speed shutdown (HWSS) events,
the power outputs of wind power plants may be subject to high
ramp rates, causing issues for the System Operator (SO) in
predicting total wind output, allocating adequate reserve levels
and minimising balancing costs. As the timing of these events is
difficult to predict, it is proposed that individual turbines may be
used as probabilistic early warning indicators of HWSS events
across sites, and by extension to a wide geographical area. The
shut-down history of two separate wind farms across Scotland is
analysed to determine the likelihood and impact of such events. It
is shown that in most cases, HWSS doesn’t result in the full loss
of availability. Factors such as turbine elevation and mean wind
exposure are key indicators of the order of shut-down across
a site. The relationship between the sites is more difficult to
characterise, but there is evidence to suggest that some sites
could be used as early warning indicators for the pattern of
HWSS across a transmission zone.
Index Terms—Wind Turbines, Forecasting, High Wind Speed
Shutdown
I. INTRODUCTION
W IND turbines are designed to operate within a partic-ular range of wind speeds. The majority of modern
onshore horizontal axis models will start to generate power at
a cut-in wind speed of 3 to 4 m/s and reach rated power at wind
speeds of between 11 to 15 m/s. In order to protect the turbine
from excessive mechanical loading, a shut-down procedure
is typically initiated when wind speeds average over 25m/s
for a preset period or for a gust around 30-35 m/s [1]. The
precise wind speed constraints and control procedure will vary
between different manufacturers and models of wind turbines.
The increasing penetration of wind energy in Great Britain
has been become of greater concern to the System Operator
(SO) of the transmission network, National Grid, which is
responsible for the real-time balancing of electricity supply
and demand. Due to the inherent variability of wind power,
the SO must procure additional reserve from other generators
in order to compensate for short-term changes in output.
The level of reserve required is typically dependent on the
total wind power level across the system and the forecast
accuracy [3].
Incidents of High Wind Speed Shutdown (HWSS) add
significant challenges to this balancing task as the power
production from a wind farm may decrease from maximum to
zero in a matter of minutes as the wind speed increases above
a critical value. The site may increase output at a similar rate
as the wind speed again reduces [4]. These rapidly changing
Fig. 1. High Wind Strategy for a Typical Wind Turbine [2]
events may not just impact the network in local regions, but
in cases where a high wind pattern or storm front moves
across the UK, could affect several wind farms at different
locations. Significant growth in wind generation, especially
offshore (where the average wind speeds can be higher), could
cause HWSS events to be more frequent. The displacement
of traditional synchronous generation with renewable sources
could also increase the severity of such incidents, due to lower
system inertia [5].
As part of a demonstration project for the Twenties re-
port [6], a new High Wind Ride ThroughTM controller devel-
oped by Siemens, which can lessen the gradients for reducing
wind turbine power, was studied at the Horns Rev 2 wind
farm in Denmark. However this is only installed at a selected
number of sites and is not included in the analysis of this
paper.
A recent HWSS workgroup established by the Grid Code
Review Panel [7] found that the infrequent and insufficient
consequences of HWSS events merited no changes to the Grid
Code at present. However, it recognised that further refinement
in the modelling and prediction of HWSS events is necessary
given the current levels of uncertainty.
This paper will initially investigate whether the shut-down
of individual turbines could be used as early warning indicators
prior to a full HWSS of the wind farm. Additionally, in
response to a technical study by RES [8], which found that
shut down behaviour of wind turbines varies by wind direction,
2this report will asses the impact of other environmental factors
relating to each turbine, such as elevation from mean sea level,
to see if they enhance the likelihood of HWSS. The occurrence
of multiple wind farm shut-downs will also be addressed to
see if any particular farms can serve as indicators for further
shut-down across the transmission network.
II. WIND FARM DATA
The data used for analysis in this report is from two separate
wind farm sites: Wind Farm A, Wind Farm B. Wind Farm A
consists of 60 turbines and Wind Farm B, 28. For each wind
farm, the data is composed of high-wind speed shut-down
alarms and associated timestamps which have been binned to
1 minute intervals. The wind farm net power is also available
at 10 minute samples. Wind speed and direction information
is taken from masts at the sites, along with the annual mean
wind speed at each turbine. Contour information obtained from
site maps provides elevations of each turbine at base level. The
data intervals for the alarms for Wind Farm A and Wind Farm
B are respectively 12th January 2010 - 31st August 2013 and
1st January 2010 - 13th December 2011.
This report will utilise the Wind Farm A data for the
majority of the individual wind turbine indication assessment,
whereas both will be used to determine individual wind farm
indicators for shut-down events across the network.
III. HIGH WIND SPEED SHUTDOWN INCIDENTS
A HWSS incident is defined by Coughlan et al to be
”when the shut-down signal exceeds 5% of availability” [9],
where the availability is the proportion of total plant power
able to operate. Based on discussions from the National Grid
workgroup, HWSS events are currently believed to develop
over a timescale of hours rather than minutes and normally
occur less than once a year, in accordance with a weather
front moving across the site region, affecting those turbines
which are at the most exposed locations [7]. The definition of
a HWSS event has not been included in the workgroup report
but is considered to be of a larger scale than that proposed by
Coughlan et al. For the wind farm data available, this section of
the report will attempt to provide further detail on the extent of
HWSS events and the time-scales involved. All other sources
of turbine shut-down are excluded and only shut-down due
to HWSS is considered. If a particular wind turbine is not
operational during a HWSS incident, the shut-down period is
determined from the nearest neighbouring operational turbine.
A. Distribution of HWSS Incidents
A HWSS incident was determined to be when a wind farm
experienced the loss of one or more turbines due to a HWSS
alarm. At Wind Farm A, for the period 10th January 2010
- 12th August 2013, approximately 30.1% of these incidents
involved the loss of less than 5% of turbine availability, 15.8%
in the loss of at least 50% turbine availability and 6.7% in the
complete loss of turbine availability and hence generation at
the site.
Of the incidents that Wind Farm B encountered during
the period 15th January 2010 - 13th December 2011, 81.3%
resulted in the loss of less than 5% turbine availability, 34.4%
in the loss of at least 50% turbine availability and 9.38% in
the complete loss of turbine availability at the site.
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Fig. 2. Percentage of separate HWSS alarm incidents (involving the loss of
one or more turbines), resulting in x amount of wind farm availability.
It is clear from the results presented in Figure 2 that
the majority of HWSS ”incidents” still leave operation at
>95% availability at Wind Farm A and >75% availability
at Wind Farm B. The percentage of cases involving full loss
of generation are of a diminished but not insignificant amount.
B. Ramp Rates
In this section, a ramp-down time period is defined from
when the number of turbines shutdown exceeds 5% of avail-
ability to when the wind farm net power reaches a minimum
level over the course of the day of that incident. The ramp-up
time period is defined from when this wind farm minimum
power level is exceeded to when the proportion of operational
plant is once again greater than 95%.
TABLE I
RAMP-DOWN/UP RATES WIND FARM A
Date Time Wind Farm Rated Power Change Ramp Rate
(mins) (%) (MW/min)
04-Feb-2013 10 -61.296 -8.4589
08-Dec-2011 20 -97.504 -6.7278
03-Jan-2012 30 -96.755 -4.4507
23-Dec-2012 30 -91.169 -4.1938
28-Dec-2012 40 -99.229 -3.4234
23-May-2011 20 71.928 4.963
04-Feb-2013 20 65.668 4.5311
23-Dec-2012 30 84.662 3.8945
24-Nov-2011 30 69.071 3.1773
21-Jan-2012 40 70.989 2.4491
Table I represents the five most notable mean ramp rates
experienced at Wind Farm A for situations of ramping down
and then ramping up in MW per minute. The resolution of
the ramp rate is restrained by the 10 minute resolution of
the wind farm power data. The table also describes the time
periods for which these ramp rates occur and the power change
experienced as a percentage of wind farm total rated power.
The average wind farm ramp rates experienced in the transition
of wind speed from cut-in to rated, are found to be -0.2922
3MW/min for ramp-down and 0.1629 MW/min for ramp-up,
however there are instances of ramp rates comparable to those
in Table I.
The presence of 23rd Dec 2012 and 4th Feb 2013 in the top
5 most significant entries for both ramp-up and ramp-down
are of particular note. These incidents represent scenarios
where the time period from loss and return of power occur
within 70 and 30 minutes of each event respectively. Although
these are isolated incidents, such scenarios may represent a
particular challenge for the system operator in the procurement
of balancing services, due to the requirement of immediate
connection and disconnection of reserve.
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Fig. 3. HWSS Incidents, Wind Farm A - 23rd of December 2012 & 4th of
February 2013
Figure 3 also shows that the ”number of operational tur-
bines” curves are quite consistent with the ”wind farm power”
curves. By investigating ramp-rates based on the number of
operational turbines, a greater resolution of ramp-rate time
periods is obtained. For HWSS incidents which involved the
loss of all turbines, it took a significant additional period
of time for the final turbine to shut-down. Hence for these
particular incidents, to give a more realistic impression of the
ramping of power, the ramp rate minimum was defined for
when 59 of the 60 turbines had experienced HWSS. A Weibull
distribution is developed for these ramp-down and ramp-up
time periods in Figure 4. A ”goodness-of-fit” was carried out
using Pearson’s chi-squared test.
The test gave χ2 = 33.0690 for ramp-down times and
χ2 = 10.8992 for ramp-up times. For each case, the degrees
of freedom were calculated as the difference in the number of
non-empty bins (k) and the number of estimated parameters
for the distribution (c = 3 for a 2-parameter Weibull distri-
bution). For (k − c) degrees of freedom and a significance
level of α = 0.05, the chi-squared critical values were found
to be χ2
1−α,k−c = 12.59 for both cases, proving that only the
hypothesis for ramp-up times was not rejected.
It should be noted that for both cases the significant con-
tribution to the overall χ2 value comes from their last bins,
with values of 29.1698 for ramp-down and 8.6697 for ramp-
up times. However, there is no justification in treating these
final bins as outliers.
The difference in minimum, average and maximum ramp
times can also be seen in Table II.
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 4500
5
10
Ramp-Down Time [min]
F
re
q
u
en
cy
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 4500
5
10
Ramp-Up Time [min]
F
re
q
u
en
cy
Fig. 4. Weibull Distribution of Ramp Times for No. of Turbines
TABLE II
RAMP-DOWN/UP TIME PERIODS - WIND FARM A
Data
10 minute 1 minute
Wind Farm Power No. of Operational Turbines
Ramp-Down Ramp-Up Ramp-Down Ramp-Up
Minimum 10 mins 20 mins 6 mins 13 mins
Mean 1.5 hrs 1.67 hrs 1.84 hrs 1.78 hrs
Maximum 7.17 hrs 4.33 hrs 7.23 hrs 4.45 hrs
While there are several cases where the loss or gain in power
took place over a period of minutes, generally, high wind speed
related ramp-down and subsequent ramp-up rates take place
over a period greater than 1 hour, This reiterates the statement
by National Grid [7] that power loss due to HWSS will be
gradual, as weather fronts move over wind farms, causing a
few high speed alarms at a time, over a period of minutes or
hours rather than seconds.
IV. CASE STUDY - HURRICANE FRIEDHELM
On the 8th of December 2011, a deep Atlantic low pressure
system brought very strong winds across the northern half
of the UK. Due to the severity of the hurricane-force winds,
the storm was offically named Hurricane Friedhelm. The event
resulted in widespread travel disruption, power cuts and school
closures. Mean wind speeds were found to be over 25m/s
across many areas of Scotland and as such the storm provided
the necessary wind speed conditions for a HWSS incident to
occur at Wind Farm A.
Figure 5 illustrates a sharp decrease in wind farm rated
power on the 8th of December 2013 roughly begins before
the mean wind speed at anemometry mast reads 25m/s, the
cut-off speed for this particular make of turbine. The wind
farm stops generating power roughly 20 minutes after the first
turbine shut-down. Full availability returns around 11 and a
half hours later, the longest period of downtime for all of
the HWSS incidents, when the mean wind speed reduces to
around 22m/s. To prevent frequent restarts and shut-downs,
control hysteresis is often applied, as in Figure 1, to ensure that
the wind turbine starts up only when the average wind speed
reaches a value lower than the shut-down wind speed [10]. The
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Fig. 5. Power Loss Comparison with Mean Wind Speed at Wind Farm A
average period of downtime at Wind Farm A due to HWSS is
approximately 4 hours.
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Fig. 6. HWSS Incident, Wind Farm A - 8th of December 2011
The number of operational turbines (which has a sample rate
of 1 minute as opposed to 10 minutes for wind farm power)
can also be inspected in Figure 6 against the wind farm power.
The turbine ramp-rate appears to be a lot more severe, with 59
of the 60 turbines shutting down within a space of 8 minutes.
This case actually serves as the minimum ramp-down time of
6 minutes, as displayed in Table II.
Examining the shutdown alarm periods in Figure 6, there
appear to be certain turbines which experience HWSS earlier
than others and therefore could serve as short-term indicators
of a full HWSS event.
The individual locations of the first 30 turbines to be shut-
down can be seen in Figure 7. There appears to be a directional
trend from the south west for the first 10 turbines. The next
20 turbines that shut-down are spread further and appear to
be in positions at the edge of the wind farm or in particularly
elevated locations. The majority of the first 30 turbines are
situated in the south or west edges of the wind farm, with the
last 30 turbines to shut down roughly situated in the centre
north or eastern parts of the site. The wind directions measured
at masts 1 (north of the site) and 2 (south-west of the site) for
the period of HWSS predominately come from the south-west
Fig. 7. Order of HWSS Shutdown - Wind Farm A, 8th of December 2011
and west respectively, showing good rationality for the order
of shut-down. A wind front is also displayed from directional
data from the nearest mast (mast 1) to the 1st wind turbine
HWSS.
Four factors relating to the order of shut-down are assessed
in Figure 8. These include: the Euclidean distance from the 1st
turbine to experience HWSS, the Euclidean distance from the
wind front, the elevation of the wind turbines (at the base) from
mean sea level and the annual mean wind speed corresponding
to the year of incident at each of the turbines. All of these
factors are ranked in accordance to the turbines which have:
the shortest distance to the 1st turbine, the shortest distance
to the wind front, greatest elevation and highest wind speed.
If the parameter shows a good relationship with turbine shut-
down order, a high Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is
expected (also displayed in Figure 8).
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Fig. 8. HWSS Ranked Indicators with Shutdown Order - Wind Farm A on
the 8th of December 2011: (a) - Proximity to the 1st Turbine HWSS, (b) -
Proximity to Wind Front, (c) - Elevation of Wind Turbine, (d) - Annual Mean
Wind Speed at Turbine
The directional trend discussed before is apparent in the
first 10 turbines in Figure 8(a) and (b). Many of the closer
turbines are the first 30 to shut-down. However, it is difficult
to interpret any overall trend for all four possible indicators.
V. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF SHUT-DOWN INCIDENTS
Figure 9 describes the number of times a particular turbine,
at Wind Farm A, was one of the first five to shut-down, for
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Fig. 9. Number of Instances that a Turbine is one of the First Five to Shut
Down
incidents which involved the HWSS of at least one turbine. It
is evident that some specific turbines are more likely to shut-
down first than others and there is the possibility that these
turbines could be used as indicators for major HWSS events.
Figure 9 can be interpreted locationally by assigning a
colour grade to those turbines at the site, displayed in Fig-
ure 10. Turbines with a higher frequency of cases exhibit
warmer colours and those with a fewer frequency of cases
exhibit cooler colours. Clearly, those turbines closer to the
south and west edge of the site are more likely to shut
down first, showing good correlation with the prevailing wind
direction(s). Those less likely to shut down first are generally
situated in the centre, north and east of the site. There also
appears to be a few cases where turbines situated on the east
side of a hill or in a small valley, are less likely to shut-down
first.
Fig. 10. Heat Map of Shutdown Cases - Wind Farm A
There are several instances where the shut-down of one or
more turbines does not result in the full loss of availability
at the site. By investigating cases where the wind farm
experiences full loss of availability in Figure 11, the five most
likely candidates are in the westerly region, with one outlier
near the peak of a hill towards the east. Circle radiuses are
exaggerated to emphasise the top five candidates in ranking
order.
If the factors from Figure 8 are analysed for all incidents
involving the loss of full availability, a clearer picture of shut-
Fig. 11. Heat Map of Full Wind Farm Shutdown Cases - Wind Farm A
down factors becomes apparent. Turbines with higher annual
mean wind speeds and elevations are generally more likely
to shut-down first, with ρ values of However, there seems to
be no improvement in trend for Figure 12 (a). The critical
Spearman’s ρ value for the four ranked variables at p = 0.05
is 0.218, with
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Fig. 12. HWSS Ranked Indicators with Shutdown Order - Wind Farm A
for all Full HWSS Events: (a) - Proximity to the 1st Turbine HWSS, (c) -
Proximity to Wind Front, (b) - Elevation of Wind Turbine, (d) - Annual Mean
Wind Speed at Turbine
These results conflict the theoretical example of the pro-
posed HWSS event by National Grid, suggesting that turbines
will shut-down in a uniform fashion as the wind field passes
over the wind farm.
VI. MULTIPLE SHUT-DOWN OF WIND FARMS
The percentage of incidents where a wind farm HWSS
incident was within a day of an incident at the other wind
farm, can be seen in Figure 13. Over different levels of avail-
ability the percentage of incidents occurring before and after
was relatively even. On average, 53.7% of HWSS incidents
occurred at Wind Farm B before A. With the wind farms close
to 180 km away from each other, the mean time separation
between incidents was approximately 6 hours and 20 minutes.
The only significant period where the shut-down of both
wind farms coincided was during Hurricane Friedhelm, on the
8th of December. As shown in Figure 14, Wind Farm B was
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Fig. 13. Incident Comparisons for Different Wind Farms
unable to consistently generate power from roughly 11:56 till
22:03. Similarly Wind Farm A had zero availability from 11:22
to 22:51.
There was one definitive occasion where both wind farms
experienced the full loss of availability due to high wind within
a day of each other. Wind Farm B generated zero net power
briefly on the 27th November 2011 00:16 and Wind Farm A
on the 26th November 14:21. It should be noted that the time
range for wind farm shut-downs to coincide is restricted by
the reduced quantity of data for Wind Farm B.
Fig. 14. Net Power At Wind Farms A and B during Hurricane Friedhelm
(*total contribution from metered wind farms)
An aggregated UK Wind power curve is also provided in
Figure 14. The curve follows a similar trend to the reduction
and increase of power of Wind Farms A and B. However,
the aggregated generation across the country still retains over
1.1GW of power over the period of the Hurricane. The
reduction in aggregated power occurs before the HWSS events
at the wind farms studied. This demonstrates the need for
further examination of other wind farms that contribute to this
overall reduction.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This analysis has shown that HWSS events are of varying
levels, with incidents predominately involving the loss of a
fraction of availability. However these events can produce
characteristically high ramp rates, this presents a particular
challenge to the System Operator in terms of the efficient
allocation of reserve while minimising balancing costs. How-
ever, while the timing of HWSS events is difficult to predict,
analysis of the shut-down order and timings indicate that the
SO may be able to make a probabilistic assessment of the
likelihood of further turbines or sites shutting down following
the first turbine(s) to do so. While it might be expected that
the shutdown order is predicated by the direction of movement
of a weather front, the data shows that differences in elevation
and mean velocity provide a stronger correlation to shutdown
order, and hence particular turbines may be suitable as HWSS
indicators. Hence, any probabilistic method for forecasting
shutdown magnitudes and timings could be tuned to particular
site configurations. While the quantity of concurrent data
available to this analysis has made it difficult to quantify
an equivalent relationship in the shutdown order of sites
across a transmission zone, particular cases have shown that
it may be possible for outlying wind farms to serve as early
warning indicators to other sites, and hence a wider analysis
of HWSS data across multiple sites could serve to generate a
probabilistic heuristic for setting reserve levels during a HWSS
event across a region with a high level of wind generation.
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